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Abstract 
With the extraordinary rise of Emmanuel Macron and the near complete collapse of the Parti 
Socialiste (PS), the past year has seen arguably the most dramatic upheaval in the French party 
system since 1958. This article develops a political economy analysis of the Hollande 
quinquennat to better understand how we arrived here. It argues that Hollande’s programmatic 
failures must be situated within an institutional account of the constraints of the presidential 
logic of the Fifth Republic and tensions between competing factional courants within the 
Socialist Party. Here we shed fresh light on this moment of rupture by situating a political 
economy analysis of Hollande’s economic programme within a more intricate institutional 
analysis of the specificities of the PS and its position within the Fifth Republic. The article 
traces the most salient political developments of the 2017 elections and outlines the political 
landscape of the contemporary French left. These factors explain why, after numerous crises 
of French socialism, this time is different. 
 
Résumé 
L'année passée a connu l'irrésistible ascension d'Emmanuel Macron et l'effondrement du Parti 
socialiste (PS), potentiellement le bouleversement le plus dramatique du système des partis 
français depuis 1958. Cet article développe une analyse de l'économie politique du quinquennat 
Hollande pour mieux comprendre comment cette situation s’est développé. Il est nécessaire 
que les échecs du programme économique de Hollande soient situés dans un compte 
institutionnel des contraintes de la logique présidentielle de la Ve République et les tensions 
entre les courants au cœur du PS. Ensuite, l'article utilise ce compte pour tracer les 
développements politiques les plus profonds de la période électorale de 2017 et détaille le 
paysage politique de la gauche en France aujourd'hui. L'article suggère que, ce faisant, il est 
possible de comprendre pourquoi, après plusieurs crises du socialisme français, celle-ci est 
différente. 
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Introduction 
The end of the Hollande quinquennat saw arguably the most dramatic upheaval in the French 
party system since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. Due to Hollande’s deep 
unpopularity, for the first time in the Fifth Republic a sitting president did not run for re-
election. The campaign itself saw the traditional bipolarity of the French party system 
shattered amidst François Fillon’s corruption scandal, and under the weight of an insurgent 
new centrist movement led by Emmanuel Macron and populist candidates from both the far-
left and far-right. Neither candidate from France’s two traditional major parties made it to the 
second-round. Fillon, candidate of the major right-wing party Les Républicains (LR) was 
beaten to second place by far-right Front national candidate Marine Le Pen, whilst Benoît 
Hamon, of the Parti socialiste (PS) came fifth with a pitiful 6.3%, eclipsed by radical left-
wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s 19%. With the election of Macron as the country’s 
youngest head of state since Napoleon Bonaparte, and the parliamentary majority obtained by 
his La République En Marche! (LRM) movement (which did not even exist 15 months before 
the election), France’s electoral landscape has been turned upside-down. 
This article focuses on the collapse of the PS and the disarray across the French left in the 
wake of Macron’s surge. In 2012, not only did Hollande become only the second Socialist 
President in the Fifth Republic, but the PS earned a majority of seats in the legislative 
elections, giving them control over both the Assemblée nationale and the Sénat 
simultaneously. Yet, from its most dominant control over France’s political institutions in the 
party’s its history in 2012, the PS in 2017 experienced a humiliating presidential debacle and 
the Socialists shed an incredible 250 seats in the parliamentary election in June. Left with a 
rump of just 30 députés, the PS’s very existence is now in doubt. Furthermore the PS’s 
electoral wipe-out had significant consequences for the balance of the nation’s political 
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divide. The left in France now occupies just 72 seats, compared to almost 500 for the centre, 
right and the far-right combined. So how did the PS fall so far so fast? And what do the 
results of the 2017 parliamentary election mean for the configuration of the French left?  
This article develops a political economy analysis of the Hollande quinquennat to better 
understand how we got here. It argues that critical failures in Hollande’s economic 
programme and governing style contributed to the contemporary parlous state of French 
socialism. Yet these failures must be situated within a set of longer-term institutional factors 
associated with the PS’s internal culture and factions, its position within the French electoral 
landscape and the specificities of political institutions. It shows how pressures posed by the 
‘presidentialising’ logic of the Fifth Republic, which has always caused tensions between and 
within the PS’s competing factional courants, came to exhaust the PS’s model of cohesion as 
developed under François Mitterrand. The rise of an insurgent centrist movement, led by a 
young and charismatic leader capable of attracting the PS’s social democratic and ‘social 
liberal’ right-wing, has pushed French socialism to breaking point. Meanwhile Mélenchon’s 
La France insoumise (LFI) movement represented a viable far left alternative, hell-bent on 
destroying the PS. Whilst the PS has experienced internal crises and significant electoral 
losses before, this combination of factors suggests that this time is different.  
The article opens with an exploration of the organisational dynamics of the PS situated within 
the institutional context of the Fifth Republic and its ‘presidentialising logic’. The second 
section provides an account of Hollande’s domestic macroeconomic programme and his 
approach to renegotiations in the European Union, before a third section builds an account of 
the downfall of the Hollande administration. This analyses the long electoral campaign 
charting Hollande’s decision not to seek re-election, the selection of Hamon as PS candidate, 
the rise of Macron and the late surge in support for Mélenchon’s populist leftist LFI 
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movement. A final section maps France’s post-election political landscape, underscoring the 
Socialist’s electoral collapse and existential fragility.   
Assessing the Hollande quinquennat and contemporary French Socialism 
Tensions within the PS’s ‘two cultures of socialism’ drew during the Hollande quinquennat 
(see McDaniel 2017). As Grunberg’s (2014) account makes clear, a crisis of PS positioning 
within the French electoral politics has been apparent for some time. The rapidly evolving 
French political landscape in 2017 exacerbated these tensions, with the PS squeezed to 
breaking point, between a bombastic Mélenchon to its left and the ‘jupiterian’ Republican 
monarch Macron in the centre-ground. Hollande’s failures must be understood in the context 
of a long-run tension between reformist and revolutionary cultures of socialism within the PS 
(Grunberg and Bergounioux 2007), which has been exacerbated by the Fifth Republic’s 
‘presidential logic’. This explains why the rise of Macron and his En Marche ! movement 
was so devastating for the PS, and thus the French left as a whole.  
The PS has always been an amalgamation of a number of different competing factions or 
courants, organised around personalities (notably potential future presidential candidates) as 
much as around doctrinal positions, and divided ideologically between more revolutionary 
and reformist elements of the socialist tradition. PS leadership requires a ‘synthesis’ of 
different sensibilities to be forged into a dominant internal coalition, with each camps’ policy 
ideas acting as the currency of internal wrangling. Although PS courants became less 
ideologically distinct after the 1970s, the party remained divided between its two ‘cultures’, 
between radical French socialism and the more reformist deuxième gauche (‘second left’) 
movement of Michel Rocard, closer to mainstream European social democracy in outlook 
and embracing the market economy and economic liberalism. For Grunberg and Bergounioux 
(2007: 7–9), tensions between these competing visions of French socialism created the 
5 
 
definitional relationship at the heart of the PS as a party of government: between the ambition 
for governmental power, and the remorse felt by the party’s left at the realities of 
governmental compromise. Grunberg and Bergounioux suggest three stages in the recurring  
cycle of French socialism’s existence: a foundation (or re-foundation) characterised by a 
asserting doctrinal orthodoxy, the compromises associated with power, and then the 
subsequent feeling of political failure and rejection of that governing record thereafter 
(Grunberg and Bergounioux 2007: 10). 
Such cycles are conducive to a highly combustible political movement, and these dynamics 
are accentuated by the competitive dynamics of France’s  presidentialised party politics. 
Following de Gaulle’s model, Fifth Republic parties approximate ‘presidential machines, 
whose primary function is to act as a springboard for a presidential candidacy, and 
subsequently to act as an organizational resource for the president’ (Clift 2005: 225). The 
PS’s internal proportional representation system thus traditionally reinforced a 
‘presidentialised factionalism’ based around its competing courants (Clift 2005: 226). Whilst 
the PS’s factionalism is in tune with the presidential logic of the Fifth Republic, it pushed to 
the fore the need for uniting behind a single présidentiable. Rallying behind a candidate is 
one thing, but remaining united in the face of the comprises and failures of government is 
another. In the case of Hollande, the pressure exerted by the ambition to govern may have 
helped unite the Socialists in 2012, but as predicted by Grunberg and Bergounioux, the 
realities of power created deep divisions. Yet the contemporary crisis goes well beyond a 
period of ‘remorse’. The electoral basis of the PS’s governing ambitions power may have 
collapsed. With Hollande’s record unpopularity, and the rise of Macron’s En Marche! 
movement, the social democratic ‘second left’ has found a new political home. With their 
departure, the PS’s hegemony on the left built by Mitterrand looks irreparably broken.  
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Hollande’s economic programme: aspirational Euro-Keynesianism meets steadfast 
fiscal consolidation  
Hollande came to power in 2012 proposing to move Europe away from austerity policies 
through renegotiating critical elements of the EU settlement, and tackling the power of global 
financial capitalism, which his Le Bourget speech infamously described as his ‘real enemy’. 
These radical discursive flourishes of the 2012 campaign, and his more ambitious policy 
pledges, reflected the imperative of attracting leftist support. In the second-round run-off of 
the PS’s presidential primary in 2011, Hollande needed the backing from third-placed king-
maker, the left-winger Arnaud Montebourg, to defeat Martine Aubry. In the first round of the 
2012presidential election, Hollande reaffirmed his commitment to the anti-austerity 
reorientation of Europe and his anti-finance declarations. Such Socialist doctrinal orthodoxy 
was welcomed by the PS rank-and-file. The delivery of Hollande’s macroeconomic 
programme, however, proved extremely challenging. Hollande’s radical pledges opened up a 
damaging and divisive gap between his campaign rhetoric and the reality of governance – a 
chasm which, ironically, Hollande and Lionel Jospin before him had been working hard to 
close since the late 1990s.  
Hollande’s economic strategy was premised upon significant renegotiation of European 
treaties, which Germany was never likely to accept. His victory was achieved amidst crisis 
and recession across the Eurozone, faltering French growth and rising unemployment. 
Following the global financial and Eurozone crises, public debt grew from around 65 per cent 
in the mid-2000s to 89.6 per cent in 2012 (INSEE 2016a), the current deficit swelled from 2.8 
per cent to 5.3 per cent between 2008 and 2012 (Eurostat 2017), and in January 2012 France 
experienced the downgrading of its ‘AAA’ sovereign bond credit rating by Standard and 
Poors. Interest rate spikes fuelled fears about debt sustainability within the Hollande camp, 
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compounded by anxieties that France’s banks remained too exposed to struggling Southern 
Eurozone economies’ sovereign debt. Consequently, alongside his anti-austerity rhetoric, 
Hollande prioritised fiscal consolidation throughout his election campaign in order to comply 
with European treaty targets, and to secure ‘credibility’ with both financial markets and 
European partners (Hollande 2011; McDaniel 2014).  
There were five key aspects of Hollande’s (2012: 135) EU proposals ‘for another European 
politics’, coalescing around a long-held Socialist ambition for a new Euro-Keynesian 
architecture within the eurozone. They were: the renegotiation of the new Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance (Fiscal Compact), the creation of ‘eurobonds’, a European-
wide financial transaction tax (EU FTT), European banking union, and a European budget for 
investment. It was clear that Berlin and Brussels would reject Hollande’s re-imagining and 
renegotiation of the Eurozone’s architecture. The day after his election, both the German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker, then head of the Eurogroup, stated 
publicly that the Fiscal Compact would not be renegotiated. Sure enough, within weeks the 
Fiscal Compact was signed into French organic law without modification. At the same time, 
Hollande’s plans for eurobonds and a real ‘European investment budget’ to fund future 
infrastructure projects fell by the wayside.  
It would be unfair, however, to suggest that Hollande’s European activism had no impact. 
Soon after arriving to power, Hollande threw his weight the idea of banking union, which 
would not only create a single monitoring authority for European bank operations, but would 
pool the risk of default through a common bailout fund. Such a mechanism would effectively 
mutualise the cost of underwriting a crisis-ridden bank’s assets, thus breaking the ‘doom 
loop’ between fragile financial institutions and over-burdened sovereigns (Clift 2018: ch 7). 
Hollande’s proposals contributed to the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
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the Single Resolution Mechanism, yet Berlin has been reluctant to pursue more ambitious 
measures which might expose Germany to financial risk and exacerbate ‘moral hazard’. 
Hollande’s strategic failure was to rely unrealistically upon significant European reform to 
enhance France’s discretionary fiscal capacity. The unravelling of Hollande’s European 
ambitions shaped the domestic macroeconomic programme of the Hollande administration, 
which had two distinct phases. 
The first phase (2012–14) saw a front-loaded fiscal consolidation premised largely on 
increased taxation. Despite his anti-austerity discourse, Hollande’s overriding goal was 
always to reduce France’s deficit and debt in line with EU targets. He pledged to ambitiously 
cut the deficit to 3 per cent by 2013 and achieve fiscal balance by 2017, whilst ensuring ‘not 
one euro more’ in debt at the end of his quinquennat. In order to reconcile such commitments 
with his anti-austerity stance, initially this fiscal effort was premised upon more progressively 
orientated taxation increases (as opposed to spending cuts). These included cancelling €29 
billion worth of niches fiscales (tax breaks), a new 45 per cent higher rate of income tax, 
reversing Sarkozy’s relief on France’s wealth tax (impôt de solidarité sur la fortune [ISF]), 
and, of course, a contribution exceptionnelle of 75% on incomes over €1m. Yet the strictures 
of an unaltered Fiscal Compact meant the Socialist administration’s domestic macroeconomic 
programme quickly altered.  
By July 2012, the government had commissioned a report on French economic 
competitiveness from the industrialist Louis Gallois, which underpinned the government’s 
new ‘National Pact for Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’, launched in November. 
This Pact augured steps towards supply-side policy, its central initiative incentivising hiring 
through a €20 billion tax credit reducing labour charges for businesses (crédit d’impôt pour la 
compétitivité et l’emploi [CICE]). Building upon this early shift, a second phase of 
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Hollande’s macroeconomic programme began in earnest in January 2014 with the launch of 
the Pacte de Responsabilité, and lasted until the end of the quinquennat. This latter phase saw 
an enhanced role for liberalising supply-side reform alongside continued fiscal consolidation. 
Hollande’s new Pacte built upon the CICE with an additional €30 billion tax cut designed to 
reduce the cost of labour. Consistent with its aim of fiscal tightening, however, the 
government pledged a €50 billion adjustment over the period 2015–17. Given the 
government’s aim to shift away from increased taxation, after admitting it was ‘sensitive’ to 
the so-called ras-le-bol fiscal of the French people, the character of this new fiscal effort was 
distinct from its earlier programme. This time, the €50 billion would come solely from 
spending cutbacks (OFCE 2016: 5).  
In the context of low growth across the Eurozone, Hollande failed to reach his own debt and 
deficit economic targets, whilst unemployment increased from around 9.5 to over 10 per cent 
in the same period (INSEE 2016b). Significantly, moreover, the changing distributional 
dynamic of the Socialist administration’s macroeconomic policy has had serious economic 
and political consequences. Its initial ‘tax shock’, the largest increase in taxation in post-war 
French history (Ragot 2014: 23), was responsible for slowing French economic growth by 
weighing on household purchasing power (OFCE 2016: 1). Yet tax cuts for business 
introduced since 2014 have yet to translate into significant job growth (France Stratégie 
2016). This caused major political difficulties for a Socialist administration which struggled 
to articulate a clear or consistent vision for the economy. Fitting Grunberg and Bergounioux’s 
model, Hollande’s programmatic failings and unfulfilled election pledges were heavily 
criticised by the party’s left. In using its fiscal marge de manœuvre to deliver tax credits for 
businesses, and looking to balance these measures with further spending cuts, the Socialist 
administration opened itself up to serious parliamentary rebellion.  The frondeur movement 
of Socialist deputes vociferously opposed most of the government’s economic and social 
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programme from 2012. Indeed, some of the Hollande administration’s most vocal opposition 
came from these Socialist rebels.  
In this context, Hollande’s failures of governing style took their toll. Inexplicably, unlike 
Mitterrand before him, Hollande did little to restrain party infighting. The frondeurs were 
constantly taking to the airwaves to decry the failings of his presidency, meanwhile 
Hollande’s economy ministers were publicly criticising each other. Successive PS First 
Secretaries (party leaders), first Harlem Désir (2012–14) then Jean-Christophe Cambadélis 
(2014–17) did not do nearly enough to maintain party discipline keep. Both they and 
Hollande failed to secure even a minimal non-aggression pact between the president and 
critical voices within ‘his’ party. The PS as a political organisation lacked the capacity to 
constrain or limit these internecine excesses. It turned out that the ‘synthesis’ between 
competing factions Hollande had orchestrated and held together as party leader between 1997 
and 2008 was not a firm or viable foundation for a programme of government.  
Hollande’s presidency could boast some achievements in labour market, pension and social 
policy reform (Milner in this issue), but the president never articulated a sufficiently clear 
governing vision. He never communicated, for example, the rationale behind and justification 
for the change of political economy approach from Euro-Keynesianism to supply side 
reforms. The fact that Hollande never effectively clamped down on ministerial infighting, 
combined with the cacophony of critical voices from his own parliamentary majority, added 
to the public’s impression of discord, disorder, and a presidency lacking direction. The master 
of the ‘synthesis’ lacked the requisite leadership capacities and characteristics which the 
French presidential Republic needs. Indeed, for all its antipathy to Bonapartism and 
presidentialism, perhaps the PS needs it too. The consequences of these failures of party 
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management have been severe, posing a threat to the PS’ future viability as a parti 
d’alternance.  
The end of the Hollande quinquennat: electoral collapse, reconfiguration on the left 
The Socialist primary  
After years of deep unpopularity, pressure grew on Hollande throughout 2016 to renounce the 
opportunity to stand again as the Socialist candidate. He had pledged in 2014 he would only 
do so if he succeeded in reducing unemployment, which he never managed. All sitting Fifth 
Republic presidents had stood again, but the PS leadership organised a primary election - 
initially planned to boost the legitimacy of Hollande’s campaign. Despite numerous calls for 
a primary of the whole left, no agreement with the PS’s major rivals, including the French 
Communist Party (PCF), Mélenchon and Macron, was reached. Hollande’s December 2016 
decision not to stand aside threw the PS into flux and opened up a rancorous debate at its 
heart. In the absence of deference to a sitting president by his or her political family, the 
primary beame an acrimonious fight for the future of the party between its two ‘cultures’. 
In an attempt to inject greater engagement into candidate selection, and thereby further 
embrace the ‘presidential’ logic of the Fifth Republic, the PS utilised an open primary for the 
first time in 2011. This process, which designated Hollande as Socialist presidential 
candidate. was largely seen as a success for the party. The same could not be said this time 
around. Presidential logic pushed the PS into the primary, but, under the strain of Hollande’s 
disastrous quinquennat, the tension inherent in the party’s ‘presidentialized factionalism’ 
broke out in to open warfare.  Seven candidates eventually stood in the first round of the 
primary, none generating much enthusiasm. The courant infighting which underpins the 
fractious internal life of the PS shaped the competition. It bore the imprint of those PS big 
beasts, such as Martine Aubry, who had seen their ambitions dashed in recent years. 
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Naturally, the primary became a contest over Hollande’s bilan. The contest was dominated 
by Manuel Valls, Hollande’s former prime minister who stood on the right of the party, and 
Arnaud Montebourg (former industry minister) and Benoît Hamon (former education 
minister), both of whom sit on the left of the party. Montebourg and Hamon had both been 
sacked from the government in August 2014 for criticising the rightward shift under Valls, 
and thus both sought to claim a rupture with the Hollande period. Valls, on the other hand, 
was characterised as the continuity candidate, despite his best efforts to downplay this image. 
In the end, the primary’s second-round run-off pitted leading frondeur Hamon against Valls, 
with Hamon winning easily, taking 58.7 per cent of the vote against 41.3 per cent for Valls, 
to become the party’s 2017 presidential candidate. 
The electorate for the primary had shrunk, leaving a more left-wing core electoral base, 
which favoured Hamon (Elabe 2017). This demonstrates a weakness of the ‘primary’ system: 
particularly in instances of low voter turnout, it allows the more radical core of the party 
militants to choose a candidate whose programme may not appeal to the wider electorate. 
Secondly, the primary reveals the relative weakness and decline of the social democratic and 
social liberal right-wing of the PS, which had played a significant role in the party leadership 
and candidacies over the past decade. Organisationally the right has withered within the PS, 
whilst on the back of Hollande’s unpopularity, the left electorate was mobilised against a 
‘social liberal’ continuity candidate.  
The presidential election 
The campaign for the presidential election was the catalyst for a series of ruptures within the 
PS, which continued to be played out over the summer. First, the party split over support for 
Hamon and his programme. While Valls initially undertook to back Hamon, by the end of 
March he had thrown his weight behind Macron. By this time, however, other prominent 
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social liberal PS figures had already left or were leaving what they saw as a sinking ship, 
including Gérard Collomb, mayor of Lyon, and the Socialist députés Richard Ferrand and 
Christophe Castaner. They all formed part of Macron’s ‘inner circle’ of advisors. More 
informal support for Macron over Hamon came from figures including député Christophe 
Caresche and later Jean-Yves Le Drian, then still defence minister in the Socialist 
government. This left Hamon and his supporters castigating the treasonous behaviour of the 
PS’s progressiste wing.    
Secondly, Macron’s rise facilitated a breakdown of party competition norms that had 
dominated French politics since the mid-1970s when the PS overtook the PCF to become the 
largest party of the left. Recognising the weakness of the Socialist Party and the fractured left 
more generally, Hamon’s strategy was to incarne an alliance between what was left of the PS 
support and the wider left, including Mélenchon and his LFI movement. Despite some 
agreements with ecologists – notably Yannick Jadot of Europe-Écologie-les Verts (EELV), 
Hamon’s strategic failure was not to realise the futility of has aspirations for uniting the wider 
left. There was never a realistic chance of such an alliance. Since leaving the party in 2008, 
Mélenchon has been dedicated to replacing the PS, not finding common cause with its left 
wing. Indeed, in January 2017, he spoke of a desired ‘nut-cracker’ effect on the PS; with LFI 
to the left of the PS and Macron’s En Marche ! in the centre-ground, he hoped discontent 
with the Hollande quinquennat would squeeze the PS ideologically and electorally into 
insignificance. Mélenchon’s programme offered a strong retort to the perceived failures of 
the Socialist administration to fulfil Hollande’s 2012 campaign pledges. Mélenchon promised 
an ambitious Keynesian investment plan worth €100 billion financed through borrowing and 
bold redistributive measures. He also ramped up LFI’s anti-EU rhetoric in underlining 
Hollande’s failures to bring about the reforms he had promised in 2012.  
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Although he finished fourth, Mélenchon usurped the Socialists, taking many of its traditional 
leftist voters to become the left’s main candidate. Mélenchon’s creditable 19.6% of the vote 
decisively eclipsed Hamon’s desultory 6.3%. On the other side of the coin, Macron took 24% 
of the first-round vote, attracting the PS’s more moderate, social democratic and social liberal 
voter base. Crucially, Macron’s polling consistently suggested a 60% plus showing in a 
potential second round run-off against Marine Le Pen. With Hamon falling in opinion polls in 
the weeks before the vote, the logic of the vote utile further pushed Socialist voters of both 
the left and the right towards Mélenchon and Macron respectively. The Socialist candidate’s 
historic low aligned Hamon with the campaign’s ‘also rans’. The nut-cracker effect had, it 
seems, worked. 
The parliamentary election 
The fallout from this Socialist dismal showing was severe, with Valls describing the party as 
‘dead’, a charge not wholly denied by the party’s First Secretary, Cambadélis, who conceded 
that a refondation of the PS, including potentially scrapping the word ‘Socialism’ from its 
name, was necessary. In a post-mortem meeting of the PS’s executive, the party abandoned 
unpalatable elements of Hamon’s leftist programme, including the universal basic income, 
taxes on robots and banking super-profits, and a ‘Citizen 49.3’. The PS legislative 
programme aligned much more closely to Macron’s, and the PS leadership chose a position 
of ‘autonomie constructive’ vis-à-vis Macron, supporting the new president on certain issues 
but retaining a critical distance, objecting to reductions in wealth taxes and flexibilising 
labour market reform.  
Not all embraced this stance, however, and the PS has fractured into three distinct elements. 
Aside from the leadership’s position, a second grouping on the right, including a number of 
government ministers, openly supported Macron and his LRM movement for the 
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parliamentary contest and ‘jumped ship’ for LRM. Some remained nominally ‘Socialist’ 
candidates, but caused a good deal of embarrassment to the party hierarchy by refusing to 
make any reference to the PS in their campaign, instead labelling their candidacy as one ‘in 
support of the presidential majority’. A third grouping, led by Hamon, totally rejected the 
‘macroncompatibilité’ of their colleagues, both in terms of active support for the presidential 
majority and the PS leadership’s attempt to cultivate an image of constructive engagement 
with Macron. Instead, the ex-presidential candidate looked to revive a union à gauche 
strategy to halt the rise of the new president’s movement, and even openly backed non-PS 
candidates against official Socialist candidates who would look to support Macron’s 
presidential majority. From both the left and the right of the PS, the traditional bond of party 
loyalty was being destroyed.  
Cambadélis might have hoped to salvage as many seats as possible by adopting Macron-
friendly candidates and policy positions, and profit from the PS’s deep-seated roots in local 
communities, and its well-resourced campaigning machine which contrasts with LRM’s lack 
of infrastructure, yet this tactic failed. Cambadélis approached the leaders of other parties in 
order to reserve up to 100 seats in order to faire barrage au Front national, but bargaining 
from a position of such electoral weakness, he was predictably pushed back. Moreover, any 
PS aspirations for ‘double-ticket candidates’ with LRM were quashed by two factors: money 
and ambition. France’s state funding for parties is determined by vote share and seats, with 
parties receiving €1.42 per vote obtained in the first round of the parliamentary election, and 
around €37,280 per year for each député elected after the second round. This creates powerful 
disincentives for double-ticket candidacies. Yet, perhaps most importantly, Macron and LRM 
meant what they said about ‘neither left nor right’ and assiduously kept their presentational 
and political distance from the PS throughout. As for LFI, Mélenchon’s strategy was always 
about annihilation of, not assimilation with, the Socialist Party. 
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The fragility of the PS is now all too evident, with the party returning to the National 
Assembly after the parliamentary election with just 30 seats, shedding 250 députés. Its first-
round vote share (7.5 per cent) was the worst in the history of French socialism, going back 
to the foundation of the SFIO in 1905. Losses on this scale inevitably saw some significant 
symbolic defeats for the party, including First Secretary Cambadélis, who had held his seat in 
Paris for 20 years, the party’s 2017 presidential candidate, Hamon, and a number of high 
profile ministers in the Hollande administration including Myriam El Khomri and Najat 
Vallaud-Belkacem. Valls retained his seat in Essonne by just 139 votes, though he was not 
endorsed to run under a PS ticket given his open support for Macron. Scanning the electoral 
map of France today reveals that the Socialists no longer possess any real regional bastions; 
the party no longer has a single member of parliament in former Socialist strongholds 
including Nord, Pas-de-Calais, and Seine-Saint-Denis, nor in the major towns of Nantes, 
Toulouse, Lyon and Marseille. Decades of work building local networks and power bases 
was largely undone in 2017 (and during the Hollande presidency more generally), and these 
will be difficult to rebuild. 
Given the two-round logic of the parliamentary election, LFI was unable to build sufficiently 
on Mélenchon’s showing in the presidential election and obtained 17 seats. Whilst 
Mélenchon dreamt of Matignon, his refusal to offer a ‘consigne de vote’ against Marine Le 
Pen after the first round of the presidential election was a clear strategic error, and his cult of 
personality dominance of his political movement also made it hard for LFI parliamentary 
candidates to get heard on the campaign trail. Significantly, however, LFI did well enough to 
form its own parliamentary group, giving it a stronger voice in parliament and greater 
financial resources. The PCF surprised by increasing its seat share, claiming 10 députés and 
seemingly halting its terminal decline. With record low turn-out (just 42.64 per cent) casting 
a pall over all the results, Macron achieved a decisive parliamentary majority of 350 seats, 
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including Bayrou’s 42 MoDem députés, although this was less than the 400+ seats suggested 
by first-round polling. Amidst the massive influx of new parliamentarians, the presidential 
majority’s new parliamentary bloc contains 140 women (48%), which Macron was quick to 
vaunt as ‘the most gender balanced’ in French history, although all the key parliamentary 
posts went to men.   
The French political landscape today 
The Socialists were decimated in the parliamentary election, and although arguably they have 
been here before – reduced to 53 députés in their crushing 1993 defeat – this time is different. 
Not only is the scale of this parliamentary defeat bigger, but the party’s devastatingly poor 
presidential vote is unprecedented. Whilst the PS did collapse in 1993, it retained strong local 
electoral bases capable of helping it revive national electoral support. Moreover, Mitterrand 
was still president at the time, and just two years later in 1995, PS candidate Jospin received 
47 per cent of the second-round vote. The political landscape around the PS has changed 
fundamentally in the last twelve months, and its position as France’s mainstream left party no 
longer seems secure. For the first time since 1962, the PS is neither in government nor the 
main opposition party; its reign as a true parti d’alternance may have come to an end. Not 
only will the PS parliamentary group struggle to make its voice heard, but the PS is, more 
than ever, a deeply divided movement. Furthermore, the electorally crippled party cannot 
hope to impose discipline upon what few PS députés remain. Given that the majoritarian 
voting system of France’s major elections punishes parties outside of the dominant two, we 
may have seen the end of the comforting bi-polarity that produced periodic electoral swings 
in the PS’s favour. Furthermore, the financial implications of the 2017 election alone raise 
questions about the PS’s ongoing viability. In the wake of its poor electoral results, the PS is 
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set to lose around €15 million of its state aid funding. There has even been talk of the party 
selling its historic headquarters in the Rue de Solférino. 
Immediately after the second round of the legislatives, Cambadélis resigned as First 
Secretary, stating that the left ‘has to change everything’. He paved the way for an interim 
direction collégiale to lead the party’s renewal with its own distinct image and programme. 
This interim leadership team has been tasked with rebuilding the party, pursuing a ‘ni 
Macron ni Mélenchon’ line, yet this will be not be straightforward as the PS must redefine 
itself within the void created by the exit of party figureheads from both its left and right 
wings, and the party remains divided in (at least) three groupings. A rump of the PS will 
continue to limp on through the new parliament, pursing its ‘ni-ni’ strategy, but the question 
is whether anyone will notice. The PS’s social liberal right sees LRM as offering a more 
attractive home, and path to power, as seen in Valls’s decision to quit the party in favour of 
sitting with the presidential majority. The left of the party argue for a more radical break with 
the Hollande quinquennat is necessary, evidenced in Hamon’s decision also to leave the PS 
and form his own movement that will ‘go beyond political parties’. In this endeavour, 
Hamon’s advances made to Mélenchon have onc again been rebuffed.   
One of the most striking consequences of 2017’s parliamentary election is the collapse of the 
left altogether, and thus the demise of bipolarity in French electoral politics. Of the PS’s 30 
députés, around a dozen are ‘Macron compatible’, whilst the left-wing frondeur movement 
has almost been wiped out from the Socialist parliamentary group. Officially the PS opted to 
enter the opposition by voting against confidence in the new government of Edouard 
Phillippe on 4 July. Yet, revealing the party’s inability to command discipline or loyalty and 
indicating its desire not to cause further instability, it retained the possibility of Socialist 
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députés abstaining, an option eventually taken up by the majority of PS députés. Three 
députés defied the weakened PS leadership to vote with Phillippe’s government. 
Mélenchon has promised to provide vocal opposition to Macron’s administration ‘in the 
Assembly and in the street’, and has been customarily forthright and colourful in criticising 
Macron’s labour market reforms, described as ‘El Khomri ++ law’ (in reference to the 
contentious and unpopular labour market reform introduced under Hollande). Yet the force of 
this opposition to Macron is weakened by the perennially fractured composition of the French 
left, with the PS, LFI and the PCF choosing to remain separate from each other in their 
parliamentary groups. In demanding voting discipline around LFI’s own programme, 
L'Avenir en commun, Mélenchon has retained his hostile stance towards the Socialists and 
once again aggravated tensions with the Communists. With seven parliamentary groups (even 
LR have split, with a splinter ‘constructive LR’ group also forming), this parliament is the 
most fractured of the Fifth Republic. Without a clear and forceful opposition, the political 
strength of Macron’s majority looks to be further enhanced. 
France’s youngest ever President can also look forward to enjoying a political economic 
environment his predecessor could only have hoped for, with economic growth returning and 
unemployment falling. After five long years of fiscal consolidation, economic conditions 
within the Eurozone have finally picked up, and the economic upturn could give Macron’s 
mandate a significant boost. In addition, he will benefit from improved relations with 
Germany. Though rapid and significant change remains unlikely, in the context of the UK’s 
exit from the European Union and the threat of a Le Pen victory in France the noises from 
Brussels and Berlin were much more positive in 2017 than in 2012. Macron has pushed 
immediately for a range of ambitious reforms at the EU level, all of which were put on the 
table by Hollande, including a Eurozone finance minister and shared budget.  
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Yet, the next five years will not be plain sailing for Macron. Very early on, several of 
Macron’s ministers were forced to resign. Most symbolically, after seeking to implement a 
projet de loi de moralisation de la vie publique, Macron forced his MoDem coalition partner, 
François Bayrou, to step down as Justice Minister amidst accusations of a MoDem ‘fake 
jobs’ scandal involving misused European Parliament funds. Programmatically, Macron’s 
first governing efforts faced the familiar challenge of enacting fiscal retrenchment to meet the 
3 per cent deficit target, whilst seeking to honour his campaign commitments and property 
and wealth tax reduction pledges. Public sector efficiency savings are the mooted means to 
square that circle – but we have heard that before. Flagship plans to flexibilise French labour 
law, to be fast-tracked through the legislative process by ‘ordinance’ rather than normal 
parliamentary bills, remain controversial and unpopular with unions and what’s left of 
France’s parliamentary opposition. 
Furthermore, should the fractured left reconfigure and rebuild itself, the traditional 
bipolarising logic of France’s two-round electoral system (which punished centrist forces 
throughout the Fifth Republic) could return at Macron’s expense. It must be remembered 
that, despite its current dominance in parliament, the record abstention levels mean that LRM 
obtained a historically low 32.3 per cent of the vote (7.3 million votes) in the first round of 
the 2017 parliamentary election. In comparison, the mainstream right lost the 2012 legislative 
elections to the PS while claiming 34.6 per cent (9 million votes). Macron’s new movement 
has achieved an extraordinary amount in an inordinately short space of time, and with it has 
transformed French politics. Yet, there remains much work to do to solidify its support in 
order to remain resilient in the face of resurgent competition from both its left and right. 
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Conclusion 
This article has suggested that in order to understand the contemporary state of French 
socialism, Hollande’s programmatic and party leadership failures must be situated within an 
understanding of longer-term institutional constraints for the PS, of factional in-fighting 
associated predominantly with the presidential logic of the Fifth Republic and the tension 
within the party between the two cultures of socialism. Although operating within an 
extremely difficult macroeconomic and institutional environment, Hollande’s management of 
his own economic programme had adverse economic and political consequences. Hollande’s 
limitations as president and party leader were exposed as the Socialist’s administration’s 
macroeconomic programme dampened the French recovery, whilst its shifting distributional 
dynamic in favouring business over households. Understanding these failings, and situating 
them within an institutional account of the PS within the Fifth Republic helps explain why 
the PS collapsed in 2017.   
Caught between LRM’s self-avowed pragmatic centrism and staunchly pro-European social 
liberalism on the one hand, and the more radical, muscularly leftist, rhetoric and eurosceptic 
stance of Mélenchon’s LFI, the emaciated PS is struggling to make its voice heard. In the 
history of the PS, only Mitterrand demonstratedd the political acumen and strength to achieve 
an enduring synthesis between the ‘first’ and ‘second’ lefts, historically a necessity for a 
dominant left party within the Fifth Republic. Ultimately, the differences between these two 
groups have never been resolved, and Hollande’s attempts to practice l'art de la synthèse et 
du compromis unravelled dramatically after 2012. Whilst Grunberg and Bergounioux’s 
model predicts a period of ‘remorse’ after periods in government, this time it seems that the 
Socialist administration’s failures have provoked a more significant reconfiguration on the 
left and the wider French party and political systems. The compromises made in power and 
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Hollande’s programmatic and leadership failings raised the traditional tensions that exist 
within PS factions to stratospheric levels. The PS is now struggling to continue operating 
after a period of near total electoral collapse, with party funds heavily diminished and 
seemingly no clear présidentiable ready and capable of pulling the party back from the brink. 
The rise of a new centrist movement led by a charismatic young leader with has lured a core 
of the rocardienne right away from the PS. The combative LFI have laid fresh claims to the 
radical-left space within French politics. This crisis of French socialism really is different, 
and deeper than earlier PS debacles.  
 
References 
Clift, B. (2005) ‘Dyarchic presidentialization in a presidentialized polity: the French Fifth 
Republic’ in Webb, P. and Poguntke, T. (eds) The Presidentialization of Politics – A 
Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Clift, B. (2018) The IMF and the Politics of Austerity in the Wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Elabe (2017) ‘Comprendre le vote / Les primaires citoyennes’, Études & Sondages, 
http://elabe.fr/comprendre-vote-primaires-citoyennes/, 29/01/2017 [accessed: 19 March 
2017]. 
Eurostat (2017) ‘General government deficit (-) and surplus (+) - annual data’, Eurostat, 
[accessed 
here:http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=teina2
00&plugin=1], accessed: 1 March 2017. 
France Stratégie (2016) ‘Comité de suivi du Crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi 
Rapport 2016’, Paris: France Stratégie, September 2016. 
Grunberg, G. (2014) ‘Le Socialisme français en crise’, Modern & Contemporary France 22 
(4), 459–71. 
23 
 
Grunberg, G. and Bergounioux, A. (2007) Les socialistes français et le pouvoir: L'ambition 
et le remords, Paris: Fayard. 
Hollande, F. (2011) ‘Hollande interview: “Je veux une gauche qui apaise”’, Le Parisien, 15 
October 2011, [accessed here: http://www.leparisien.fr/election-presidentielle-
2012/candidats/francois-hollande-je-veux-une-gauche-qui-apaise-15-10-2011-1654124.php], 
accessed 20 August 2016. 
Hollande, F. (2012) Changer de destin, Paris: Robert Laffont. 
INSEE (2016a) ‘Tableau: Dette publique au sens de Maastricht’, Dette et déficit publics, 
Tableaux de l'Économie Française Édition 2016, INSEE, [accessed here: 
https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1906709?sommaire=1906743#tableau-T14F131G1], 
accessed 1 May 2017. 
INSEE (2016b) ‘The unemployment rate was stable in Q1 2016’, INSEE, [accessed here: 
https://www.insee.fr/en/statistiques/2011466#consulter], accessed 1 April 2017. 
McDaniel, S. (2014) ‘Post-crisis social democratic policy capacity in France and the United 
Kingdom: A lesson from the globalisation and social democracy debate’, French Politics 12 
(4), 283–309. 
McDaniel, S. (2017) ‘French Socialism in crisis: The undoing of Hollande’s ‘anti-austerity’ 
programme’, Renewal 25 (1), 39–52. 
OFCE (2016) ‘Le Quinquennat de François Hollande : Enlisement ou Rétablissement ?’, 
Policy Brief 2, 5 September 2016, Paris: OFCE, 1–10. 
Ragot, X. (2014) ‘Le désajustement européen’, problèmes économiques, November 2014 
special edition, pp.17–25. 
 
 
 
 
